1 Gallois (1990) has gone on to propose a "companion" analysis of identity sentences involving temporal operators that accommodates what he calls the occasional identity of objects-the view that some objects may be identical at one time but distinct at another. But there are pivotal points of disanalogy between Gallois' accounts of contingent identity and occasional identity; so my comments here should be regarded as applying solely to his position on the contingency of identity.
On Restricting Rigidity
-Murali Ramachandran (muralir@sussex.ac.uk) From: Mind 101 (1992) pp. http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/muralir/pubs/restrict1.pdf 2 Here's a brief outline of Gallois' position. He revives a familiar scenario involving the identity of ships. We are asked to consider a world W in which a ship designated "Mary" undergoes gradual plank replacement so that what eventually emerges is a ship made from a collection of planks, C 1 , that has no members in common with the original collection of planks, C, that made up Mary. The resulting ship is christened "Alice" in W We are then asked to consider a possible world W, which contains two ships: Mary 1 made up of planks from C (arranged in the same way as when they constituted Mary in W) and Alice 1 made up of planks from C, (arranged in the same way as when they constituted Alice in W). Now, Gallois says:
There is a consideration in favour of identifying Mary with Mary 1 . After all, Mary and Mary 1 are constituted from exactly the same planks organized in exactly the same way. The same consideration tells in favour of identifying Alice with Alice 1 . If we make these identifications then "Alice" and "Mary" designate the same ship in W but distinct ships in W 1 . That is, "Mary is identical with Alice" is contingently true... (1986, p. 58) His contention is that the following view:
Mary is contingently identical with Alice, and in the contingently true identity sentence "Mary is identical with Alice", "Mary" and "Alice" function as rigid designators (1986, p. 60) can be coherently maintained on an extensionally adequate account of rigidity-an "extensionally adequate" account being one such that all and only those terms we presently regard as rigid come out rigid. To this end he introduces the following analysis of rigidity, or "rigid designation condition" (1986, p. 60 Informally, a term rigidly designates an object, x, in a world, W, if and only if whatever object it designates in any world is identical with x in W. Any term that is rigid according to RDC is restrictedly rigid.
Given RDC, rigid designators of the same object need not be coreferring in every world. We can therefore hold that "Mary" and "Alice" rigidly designate Mary (= Alice) in W, but that "Mary" designates Mary 1 while "Alice" designates Alice 1 in W 1 . Gallois claims that, given RDC, and granting that identity is an equivalence relation within worlds, 3 we can hold (1)- (5) Suppose there are two objects in the actual world, Mark and Amanda, which we consider to be only contingently non-identical. The problem is this: how can we express their contingent non-identity, given RDC? If the name "Mark", say, restrictedly rigidly designates Mark in the actual world, then whatever it designates in any other world is identical with Mark in the actual world. Because of this, "Mark" and "Amanda" cannot codesignate an object in any world, since that object would have to be identical with both Mark and Amanda in the actual world-a possibility ruled out by the equivalence of identity in the actual world. What we get, then, is that "Mark is identical with Amanda" is false in every world, i.e. necessarily false.
Consequently, given RDC, we cannot express any contingent non-identities. At any rate, the truth of "α is contingently non-identical with β" will not correspond with the contingent truth of "α is non-identical with β" (where "α" and "β" are rigid designators); this marks a significant point of disanalogy with contingent identity, and therefore requires some vindication from Gallois. The issue cannot be shirked, for Gallois' own example commits him to the contingency of non-identity: since he maintains that Mary 1 and Alice 1 are non-identical in W 1 but identical in W, he is surely compelled to maintain that Mary 1 and Alice 1 are only contingently nonidentical in W 1 . I submit then that the inexpressibility of contingent non-identity is a substantial but intractable problem for Gallois' account.
Finally, a warning about a different brand of "restricted" rigidity, one which circumvents our problem about the expression of contingent non-identities. Consider RDC*: (∀d)(∀x)(∀W)(d rigidly designates x in W ↔ (∀W′)(∀y)(d designates y in W′ → in W′: x=y)).
Informally, by RDC*, a term rigidly designates an object, x, in a world, W, iff http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/muralir/pubs/restrict1.pdf 5 whatever object it designates in any world, W′, is identical with x in W′. Now, whereas RDC precludes rigid designators of different objects-e.g. "Mark" and "Amanda"-from codesignating an object in some world, RDC* precludes rigid designators of the same object-e.g. "Mary" and "Alice"-from designating different objects in some world. Thus, RDC* does not block the expressing of contingent nonidentities, and, for example, we are not prevented from maintaining that "Mark is nonidentical with Amanda" is only contingently true. Instead, however, we are now prevented from expressing the contingent identity of objects-in particular, the contingent identity of Mary and Alice-since, as was just noted, RDC* dictates that terms which rigidly designate the same object cannot but corefer in every world. So, for Gallois' purposes, RDC* is little better than RDC. 4 My target in this note has been Gallois' method of accommodating the contingency of identity rather than the notion of contingent identity itself. So far as I can see, and as I have argued, restricting rigidity in the manner he suggests is not adequate for his needs. 
